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Abstract
In an economy with weak economic and political institutions, the major institutional choices
are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators. The conventional wisdom presumes that as
rent-seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves, institutions such as enforcement of the property
rights will emerge eventually. We explicitly model a dynamic game between oligarchs and a
dictator, who can contain rent-seeking. The oligarchs choose either a weak dictator (who can
be overthrown by an individual oligarch) or a strong dictator (who can only be replaced via
a consensus of oligarchs). In equilibrium, no dictator can commit to both: (i) protecting the
oligarchs￿property rights from the other oligarchs and (ii) not expropriating oligarchs himself.
We show that a weak dictator does not limit rent-seeking. A strong dictator does reduce
rent-seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs. We show that even though eliminating
rent-seeking is Pareto optimal, weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent-seeking
continues. This outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile.
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￿The appointment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people, and he is
elected by them out of their own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue
and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the
notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants
have been demagogues who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables.￿
Aristotle, ￿Politics￿ .
1 Introduction
From Adam Smith to Douglass North to Andrei Shleifer, economists have agreed that protection
of property rights is the key precondition for investment and growth. The private property rights
are vulnerable to several kinds of risks. While Adam Smith feared expropriation by the crown,
political economists of the 20th century blamed democratic redistribution through over-taxation
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000) or even an outright expropriation by the poor majority (Grossman,
1994, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). On the other hand, ever since Hobbes (1651) and the
Federalist Papers (1788), economists and political scientists recognize that the lack of a strong
central authority may also undermine property rights as private agents would expropriate each other
and over-invest in rent-seeking rather than productive activities. Both issues remain highly relevant
in modern economies. Many governments prey upon their subjects￿property (see a discussion in
Frye and Shleifer, 1997, and Robinson, 2001). At the same time, development of secure property
rights was slowed down in several post-communist economies due to the weakness of the state and
rent-seeking by a newly emerged class of so-called ￿oligarchs￿ , the major impediment to protection
of property rights (Hellman, 1998, Sonin, 2003, Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2004, Ho⁄ and Stiglitz,
2004, Acemoglu, 2005, Gradstein, 2007).
A distinguishing feature of oligarchy￿ either the one of merchant clans in medieval Italy, that of
robber-barons in the US in the late 19th century, the traditional one in East Asia or Latin America,
or the one recently emerged in Russia￿ is that each oligarch is not only very rich and politically
well-connected, but is also a strategic player in national politics. These oligarchs expropriate the
poor majority by subverting institutions of property rights protection such as courts (Glaeser et
al., 2003, Acemoglu, 2007). Yet, as oligarchs use their political power to expropriate the rest of
the economy, they might get involved in a costly rent-seeking race against each other. In this
case, it is in their collective interest to maintain a certain level of property rights protection.
1Boycko et al. (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argued that private owners would lobby for
market-supporting institutions. Does this mean that the secure property rights have to emerge
endogenously? Polishchuk and Savvateev (2004) and Ho⁄ and Stiglitz (2004) suggest that the
oligarchs su⁄er from a coordination problem: while property rights would indeed bene￿t them
collectively, each individual oligarch ￿nds it optimal to deviate. A natural political response would
be to bring up an arbiter (a podesta, a president, or a dictator) who would resolve the coordination
problem and provide the desired level of property rights enforcement.
In selecting a new leader, the oligarchs face the very same political commitment problem de-
scribed above. As North (1981) put it, the government which is strong enough to enforce property
rights may ￿nd it di¢ cult to commit not to use its strength to expropriate private owners. The
oligarchs need to ￿nd a ruler (a ￿dictator￿ ) who should be able both to suppress individual oli-
garchs￿temptation to rent-seek against each other and to commit not to expropriate individual
oligarchs himself. We consider a dynamic game between the oligarchs and the dictator and show
that no dictator can deliver on both counts. The dictator￿ s behavior depends crucially on his
ability to withstand the oligarchs￿pressure. We distinguish between weak and strong dictators.
Weak dictators are the ones without popular support; they can be overthrown by any individual
oligarch. A strong dictator is a charismatic leader with substantial popular support and therefore
requires a consensus of oligarchs to be removed from the o¢ ce. We show that a weak dictator
cannot expropriate the oligarchs; but neither can he resolve the rent-seeking problem. As any
individual oligarch can remove him from o¢ ce, the dictator cannot prevent rent-seeking by either
oligarch. When appointing a strong dictator, oligarchs solve this problem: the dictator￿ s decisions
are protected by the oligarchs￿inability to coordinate. Thus, a strong dictator can contain the rent-
seeking. However, he will also collude with some oligarchs to expropriate others. Therefore, even
though the weak dictator cannot enforce the property rights and is therefore Pareto suboptimal,
the oligarchs may still prefer him in equilibrium.
The other distinction between the weak dictators and the strong ones is the ￿ exibility of regime
to changes in economic environment. Suppose the oligarchs have appointed a weak dictator but
then situation has changed so that a weak dictator is no longer optimal. Oligarchs can easily
replace him with a stronger one. However, once the situation changes back and a weak dictator is
preferred by the oligarchs, they cannot remove the dictator. The latter uses divide-and-rule tactics
and successfully defends his position. This asymmetry implies that the oligarchs will always be
cautious about bringing in the strong dictator ￿by doing so, they give up the option of replacing
2him. The irreversibility of appointing a strong dictator implies a relationship between uncertainty
and the choice of the ruler. The theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994) suggests that the more volatile the environment, the less inclined the parties are to make an
irreversible investment. Therefore in the more volatile economies, the oligarchs are more likely to
￿wait-and-see￿and appoint a weak ruler even if a strong ruler would be better on average. This
logic implies that weak property rights may well be a steady state in a dynamic game even if the
oligarchs would bene￿t from secure property rights and could potentially bring a dictator who could
enforce them.
The risks of appointing a strong dictator are best illustrated by the fate of Russian oligarchs
(see an early discussion in Glaeser et al., 2003, and Ho⁄ and Stiglitz, 2004). These oligarchs were
certainly strategic: according to a non-academic estimate of infamous tycoon Boris Berezovsky (Fi-
nancial Times, 1996), seven bankers controlled half of the economy in 1996 and directly in￿ uenced
economic policy; Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) estimated that 22 groups controlled 40% of the
economy in 2003; in recent years, Forbes magazine estimated the total wealth of 30-50 richest Rus-
sians at 25-30% of Russia￿ s GDP. As argued in Boone and Rodionov (2002), the oligarchs initially
bene￿ted from rent-seeking as they diluted the stakes of the government and outside owners. Once
they consolidated ownership and saw the huge bene￿ts to limiting the rent-seeking (due to high
resource prices), they switched from rent-seeking to investment. This is why most oligarchs sup-
ported Vladimir Putin￿ s bid for presidency on a law-and-order platform. Yet, Putin soon became
too strong and independent of the oligarchs and expropriated quite a few of them. Out of the
Berezovsky￿ s Group of Seven, one has lost in￿ uence before Mr. Putin came to power, but two more
(including Berezovsky himself) went into exile, while another one was imprisoned. This story is not
unique; one could also easily ￿nd similarities to podesteria in medieval cities in Italy (Greif, 2007),
Por￿rio Diaz￿Mexico (Robinson, 2003), and to robber barons in the Gilded Age (Glaeser et al.,
2003), when the Progressive movement eventually came to power and introduced tough antitrust
regulation.1
Our work is related to three strands of recent research in economics and political science. First,
there is a newly emerged ￿oligarchs￿literature. A few papers discuss the issue of (non-)emergence of
property rights in oligarchic economies, both theoretically (Sonin, 2003, Polishchuk and Savvateev,
1The institutional subversion by the rich has started in the US as early as in 1820s. In his Veto Message on the
Second Bank, 1832, President Andrew Jackson said ￿It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend
the acts of government to their sel￿sh purposes.￿
32004, Ho⁄ and Stiglitz, 2004, Acemoglu, 2007, Braguinsky and Myerson, 2007, Gradstein, 2007),
and empirically (e.g., Boone and Rodionov, 2002, Claessens et al, 2000, Guriev and Rachinsky,
2005). Our analysis is particularly close to that of Acemoglu (2007) and Braguinsky and Myerson
(2007). Acemoglu (2007) analyzes the trade-o⁄ between property rights for oligarchs and the rest
of the society (while we focus on the interaction of property rights of individual oligarchs). Also, in
Section 4.1, Acemoglu discusses the e⁄ect of heterogeneity of oligarchs and the possibility of regime
change through a coalition of low-skilled oligarchs and the poor against the high-skilled oligarchs.
This scenario is similar to the collusion between a dictator and an oligarch to expropriate another
oligarch, and to the divide-and-rule tactics that help a strong dictator to remain in power in our
paper. Yet, our setup and the regime change mechanisms are very di⁄erent. Braguinsky and
Myerson (2007) develop a truly dynamic model of capital accumulation in an oligarchic economy
allowing for expropriation of some oligarch by the others: Both Acemoglu (2007) and Braguinsky
and Myerson (2007) model oligarchs as in￿nitesimal and non-strategic players.
The literature on oligarchs is also related to the work on selective protection of property rights.
Both Greif (2006) and Haber et al. (2003) show how the medieval Mediterranean rulers and the 19th
century Mexican presidents enforced property rights as a private good. These rulers used divide-
and-rule strategies trading protection of property rights of individual owners for political support.
Robinson (2003) and Treisman (2003) show how the reformers in modern Russia, Argentina, and
Brazil have made similar deals with speci￿c interest groups to promote their reforms. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) provide other examples and build a theory of a non-democratic government
that is accountable to a selectorate, a group that is su¢ ciently strong to maintain an incumbent
in o¢ ce. Acemoglu et al. (2004), Padro i Miguel (2006), and Besley and Kudamatzu (2007)
build formal theories of such regimes by explicitly modelling the divide-and-rule game (see also a
dynamic model of leadership turnover in Gallego and Pitchik, 2004). This literature identi￿es a
few solutions to the political commitment problem above; in particular, Greif (2007) shows how
it can be resolved through reputation or collective reputation; Haber et al. (2003) focus on the
third-party enforcement. In this paper, we assume that these mechanisms do not function, and
there is no external source of commitment. There are also no sunk investments that can be used
as a hostage.
Second, we contribute to the ￿new comparative economics￿(Djankov et al, 2003). The trade-o⁄
faced by the oligarchs in our model is very similar to the main trade-o⁄ in this literature, the one
between disorder (weak property rights, rent-seeking, expropriation by each other), and dictatorship
4(strong property rights, expropriation by the dictator). The analysis of costs of disorder and
dictatorship has also been carried out by students of political history from Aristotle and Machiavelli
to Finer (1997). Machiavelli (1515, ch. IV) compares principalities with and without strong barons
(using the examples of Turkey vs. France, ch. IV and XIX, and the use of divide-and-rule tactics
by Alexander VI against Orsini and Colonna clans in Rome, ch. VII). He argues that principalities
with a weak central ruler cannot be run e⁄ectively; they are also an easy prey for an external enemy
to capture. Finer (1997) considers many examples of Palace/Nobility polities comparing regimes
with di⁄erent degrees of Palace￿ s strength relative to that of the Nobility. He also emphasizes the
disadvantages of the regimes with utter weakness of central authority, especially the eighteenth
century Poland, where each magnate could veto any decision or Tokugawa Japan (which Finer call
￿ anarchy institutionalized￿ ).
Our contribution to the new comparative economics is to show how the dictatorship-disorder
trade-o⁄ is resolved in a dynamic game between oligarchs and dictators, why disorder may emerge
even when it is clearly ine¢ cient; we also develop a comparative statics analysis with regard to the
degree of uncertainty and volatility. In this sense, our paper is similar to Acemoglu (2005) who
studies the e⁄ect of a state￿ s strength on economic performance. Acemoglu￿ s ￿strong￿state is the
one capable of imposing high taxes; this state is e⁄ective at providing public goods but also sti￿ es
private agents￿incentive to invest. If the private agents have an e¢ cient tax evasion technology,
the state is labelled ￿weak.￿The weak state does not overtax returns to private investments but
fails to collect taxes to provide public goods. In Section 3, Acemoglu (2005) replaces the notion of
the state￿ s ￿strength￿with that of ￿political power￿which is similar to ours: the ruler is politically
powerful if it is hard to replace him. In Section 4, Acemoglu also studies ￿consensually-strong
states￿ . Here the ruler and the citizens can commit to a deal where the ruler collects high taxes
and invests them e¢ ciently in public goods. While our analysis focuses on similar issues, we analyze
the interactions between strong/weak rulers and strategic oligarchs; we also allow for an endogenous
choice of the ruler￿ s strength by the oligarchs.
The costs of disorder are also explicitly studied in the ￿lawlessness and economics￿literature.
Dixit (2004) analyzes costs and bene￿ts of private enforcement of contracts and property rights.
Our analysis is especially related to the results best described by a quote from Gambetta (1993,
p.198): ￿protectors, once enlisted, invariably overstay their welcome￿ . In other words, similarly to
our dictators hired by oligarchs to resolve their con￿ icts, private enforcers may abuse their authority
and expropriate their clients.
5The third related strand of the literature is the political economy of non-democratic regimes.
This literature raises an empirical question whether or not an oligarchic regime might be sustainable
politically in the long run. The Latin American experience demonstrates that a country with a small
rich elite (though not exactly few strategic oligarchs) and a poor majority often oscillates between
an elitist dictatorship and populist democracy.2 Existing dynamic models of such processes assume
exogenous economic shocks as the main underlying cause of coups and revolutions (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001, 2006). A paper which comes closest to ours is Robinson (2001) where the governing
elites are more likely to be predatory if better institutions may threaten their hold on power and
the bene￿ts that come with the power. The aim of our analysis is to go beyond Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001, 2006), and Robinson (2001) by analyzing the mechanisms of interaction not only
between the poor and the rich, but also of a strategic interaction within the ruling elite.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the setup, and Section 3 provides
the analysis of the choice of the dictator and the equilibrium level of property rights protection.
In Section 4, we discuss the path dependence and the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the choice of the
property rights. Section 5 discusses extensions, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
We consider a repeated game between two oligarchs O1;2 and a dictator D. In each period, oligarchs
choose whether to produce or engage in rent-seeking. Given the other oligarch￿ s choice, rent-seeking
is a dominant strategy. Yet, the rent-seeking equilibrium is ine¢ cient. In other words, the oligarchs





We assume ￿ < r < ￿ < R. Clearly (r;r) is a unique Nash equilibrium but (￿;￿) is Pareto-
optimal.
The oligarchs would bene￿t from an external enforcer of property rights who could rule out the
2The theory of political transitions between oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny also dates back to Aristotle and
Plato. Aristotle already argued that oligarchy is almost a precondition for the rise of dictators. Yet, the recent formal
analysis of political transitions is still restricted to comparing oligarchy vs. democracy or dictatorship vs. democracy.
3This prisoner￿ s dilemma can be formally microfounded in a general equilibrium model, see, for example Murphy
et al. (1991), Sonin (2003), Polischuk and Savvateev (2004).
6rent-seeking equilibrium. We assume that the oligarchs may appoint a ruler who can choose one of
two levels of property rights protection p = 0;1: The high level of property rights protection p = 1
incurs prohibitively high costs of rent-seeking so that the oligarchs choose the (￿;￿) outcome. If
the protection is weak p = 0 then both oligarchs rent-seek in equilibrium.
The oligarchs can choose whether to appoint a strong or a weak dictator. We proxy the dictator￿ s
strength by his political support base independent of oligarchs. A weak dictator is one that each
individual oligarch can remove from o¢ ce unilaterally. A strong dictator can withstand the pressure
of a single oligarch; it takes two oligarchs to remove him. A very strong dictator is one that two
oligarchs cannot overthrow even if they coordinate. In the Sections 2-4, we will study a trade-o⁄
between choosing weak vs. strong dictator; we shall discuss the very strong ones in Section 5.
The dictator chooses p and asks oligarchs for contributions ti. If he is weak, he needs to make
sure that both oligarchs are happy. If the dictator is strong, he only has to keep one oligarch
satis￿ed and can a⁄ord to expropriate the other one.
Weak property rights protection p = 0 is costless but strong property rights protection p = 1
costs the dictator c.
Whenever the oligarchs manage to replace the dictator, each oligarch incurs a cost of regime
turnover K.
2.1 Notation and assumptions
We model the game in discrete time. The discount rate is ￿: The distribution of bargaining power
between the dictator and the two oligarchs is 1 ￿ ￿; ￿=2; ￿=2: The dictator￿ s expected payo⁄ is
UD where D 2 fS;Wg is the type of dictator for the next period, strong or weak, respectively.
Similarly, each oligarch￿ s expected payo⁄ is VD : VS if the dictator is strong, VW if the dictator is
weak, and VN; if the dictator is new.
Let us also introduce the social returns to protecting property rights:
￿ = 2￿ ￿ 2r ￿ c: (2)
If this gain is very high, all dictators will protect property rights; if it is negative, neither ruler ever
would. We will therefore focus on the intermediate case: we will assume that enforcing property
rights is e¢ cient but the e¢ ciency gains are not too high. This assures that a strong dictator chooses
p = 1 and a weak dictator chooses p = 0; otherwise the two would choose the same property rights
protection.
7Assumption. The e¢ ciency gains from property rights enforcement are positive but are not
very large
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ R ￿ r: (3)
2.2 Timing
The timing within each period is as follows:
￿ Bargaining on a contract {p;t1;t2g where p = f0;1g is the level of property rights protection;
ti ￿ 0 is the payment by each oligarch. With probability 1￿￿; the dictator makes it a take-it-
or-leave o⁄er to both oligarchs. With probability ￿=2 each oligarch makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄er to the other oligarch and the dictator.
￿The o⁄er is accepted, and the game continues.
￿If the o⁄er is rejected, the dictator is removed from o¢ ce. The oligarchs select a new
dictator for the next period.
￿ The dictator implements p: Each oligarch Oi pays ti:
￿ Oligarchs produce or rent-seek.
￿ Payo⁄s ￿;R;r;￿ are realized.
￿ Next period begins.
3 The equilibrium choice of property rights
We ￿rst solve the within-period game given the dictator￿ s type and expected payo⁄s from the
continuation subgames. Then we will describe the choice of the dictator.
3.1 Strong dictator
We model the bargaining between the dictator and the oligarchs by considering the contingencies
where the dictator gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er (this takes place with probability 1 ￿ ￿)
and the contingencies where the oligarchs make an o⁄er (probability ￿=2 each). If the parties
disagree, the dictator is removed from o¢ ce and gets 0; each oligarch gets r + ￿VN:
8Let us start with the case where the dictator makes an o⁄er. Since the dictator is strong, he
o⁄ers r + ￿VN to O1 and zero to O2: We shall now compare the dictator￿ s payo⁄s for the di⁄erent
levels of property rights protection.
￿ The dictator o⁄ers p = 1; and t1;t2: O1 gets ￿￿t1+￿VS = r+￿VN: O2 gets ￿￿t2+￿VS = 0:
The dictator￿ s payo⁄ is
￿c + t1 + t2 + ￿US = 2￿ ￿ r ￿ c + ￿US + 2￿VS ￿ ￿VN: (4)
￿ The dictator o⁄ers p = 0; and e t1;e t2: O1 gets r￿e t1+￿VS = r+￿VN: O2 gets r￿e t2+￿VS = 0:
The dictator￿ s payo⁄ is e t1 + e t2 + ￿US = r + ￿US + 2￿VS ￿ ￿VN:
Comparing the two payo⁄s we establish that a strong dictator o⁄ers p = 1 whenever ￿ =
2(￿ ￿ r) ￿ c > 0 (as assumed by (3)).
Now we should check what happens if O1 makes an o⁄er (this happens with probability ￿=2).
As the dictator is strong, this oligarch is happy to give zero rent to both the dictator and the other
oligarch. Let us now compare O1￿ s payo⁄s for di⁄erent levels of property rights protection.
￿ O1 o⁄ers p = 1;t1;t2: The dictator￿ s payo⁄is ￿c+t1+t2+￿US = 0: O2 gets ￿￿t2+￿VS = 0:
O1 gets
2￿ ￿ c + ￿US + 2￿VS: (5)
￿ O1 o⁄ers p = 0;e t1;e t2: The dictator￿ s payo⁄ is e t1 +e t2 +￿US = 0: O2 gets r ￿e t2 +￿VS = 0: O1
gets
2r + ￿US + 2￿VS:
Again, the choice of property rights is e¢ cient: p = 1 whenever Assumption (3) holds.
Notice that the parties reach an agreement if (4) is positive (which is equivalent to (5) exceeding
r + ￿VN):
Claim 1 A strong dictator chooses p = 1 whenever Assumption (3) holds and (4) is positive.
Otherwise p = 0 or the dictator is removed.
We shall assume that the dictator￿ s choice of whom to expropriate is random. Therefore, if the





(r + ￿VN) +
￿
2
(2￿ ￿ c + ￿US + 2￿VS)
while the dictator gets
US = (1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ c + ￿US + 2￿VS ￿ r ￿ ￿VN):
Solving this system, we ￿nd the joint surplus JS = US + 2VS = 2￿￿c
1￿￿ : Therefore












It only remains to check that (4) is positive:
2￿ ￿ c
1 ￿ ￿
￿ r + ￿VN: (7)
We will show below (as we solve for VN) that this inequality does hold:
3.2 Weak dictator
As the dictator is weak, he needs to satisfy each oligarch￿ s participation constraint. Otherwise, each
oligarch can deviate unilaterally and remove the dictator from the o¢ ce.
First, consider the case where the dictator makes the take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er (again, this happens
with probability 1 ￿ ￿).
￿ The dictator o⁄ers p = 1; and t1;2 = t: Each oligarch￿ s payo⁄ is ￿ ￿ t + ￿VW: The dictator
gets ￿c + 2t + ￿UW:
￿Now either oligarch can deviate unilaterally and remove the dictator. This oligarch
would get R+￿VN, while the dictator would get 0. To rule this out, the dictator has to
o⁄er t = ￿(VW ￿ VN) ￿ (R ￿ ￿):
￿ The dictator o⁄ers p = 0; and e t1;2 = e t: Each oligarch gets r ￿ e t + ￿VW: The dictator￿ s payo⁄
is 2e t + ￿UW:
￿If an oligarch deviates and removes the dictator, the oligarch gets r + ￿VN: Hence,
e t = ￿(VW ￿ VN):
10The dictator compares his payo⁄s ￿c + 2￿(VW ￿ VN) ￿ 2(R ￿ ￿) + ￿UW and 2￿(VW ￿ VN) +
￿UW: Apparently, the dictator always chooses weak property rights protection p = 0 and gets
￿UW + 2￿VW ￿ 2￿VN: (8)
(which must be positive). Each oligarch receives r + ￿VN.
Now consider the contingency where O1 makes an o⁄er. The o⁄er includes transfers t1;2, and
either strong or weak property rights protection p = 0;1.
￿ O1 o⁄ers a contract p = 1;t1;t2: The other oligarch O2 gets ￿ ￿ t2 + ￿VW which must
be at least as high as R + ￿VN: Hence t2 = ￿ + ￿VW ￿ R ￿ ￿VN: The dictator receives
￿c + t1 + t2 + ￿UW = 0: O1￿ s payo⁄ is ￿ ￿ t1 + ￿VW = 2U ￿ c + ￿UW + 2￿VW ￿ R ￿ ￿VN:
￿ O1 o⁄ers p = 0;e t1;e t2: The other oligarch O2 gets r ￿ e t2 + ￿VW = r + ￿VN: The dictator gets
e t1 + e t2 + ￿UW = 0: Hence O1￿ s payo⁄ is r ￿ e t1 + ￿VW = r + ￿UW + 2￿VW ￿ ￿VN
The oligarch O1 compares the payo⁄s and chooses p = 0 whenever 2￿ ￿ R ￿ r > c:








(r + ￿VN) +
￿
2
(r + ￿UW + 2￿VW ￿ ￿VN):
The dictator￿ s payo⁄ is as follows
UW = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿UW + 2￿VW ￿ 2￿VN):
Solving this system, we ￿nd the joint surplus:









VW = (1 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿VN) +
￿r
1 ￿ ￿
113.3 The choice of a new dictator
In this section, we solve for the oligarchs￿payo⁄ VN in case the dictator is removed. In this con-
tingency, the oligarchs are to choose a new dictator, either a weak one or a strong one. Comparing
the oligarchs￿payo⁄s (6) and (9) for either type of dictator, we ￿nd that the choice of the new
dictator depends on VN : a strong dictator is chosen whenever




where ￿ is the social return to enforcing property rights (2). The left-hand side is the cost of the
having a strong dictator (the loss due to expropriation of one of the oligarchs). The right-hand side
is the bene￿t of property rights protection enforced by a strong dictator.
Let us now ￿nd VN: The cost of changing a dictator is K hence
VN = ￿K + maxfVS;VWg: (11)
Solving the system of equations (6), (9), (11), (10) we arrive at the following
Proposition 1 There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The oligarchs will choose a strong
dictator whenever






1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
: (12)
Otherwise they will choose a weak dictator.
Proof. Let us assume that VS > VW: Substituting (11) into (6), (9), and (10) we ￿nd VS ￿ VW =
￿





The case VS < VW is similar: VS ￿VW =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
2(1￿￿): Therefore VS ￿VW > 0 if and only if
￿ > ￿ ￿.
The condition (12) is intuitive. The greater the return to enforcing property rights ￿; the
more likely a strong dictator is chosen. The greater the payo⁄ to rent-seeking r (compared to the
complete expropriation by a strong ruler), the more likely the weak ruler is to emerge. One can
also interpret this result as comparative statics with regard to external threat. Suppose there is
an external threat that reduces payo⁄s in all states so that both r and ￿ decrease by the same
amount. In this case, a strong dictator is more likely to emerge; indeed, ￿ remains the same while
r decreases. This result is consistent with Besley and Persson (2007) as well as with the argument
by Machiavelli (1515, ch. IV).
12Interestingly, the greater is the cost of turnover K; the more likely is the strong dictator. The
result is not driven by the fact that the weak rulers do not last long. Indeed, this setup involves
no uncertainty; once the ruler is chosen, he remains in power in equilibrium inde￿nitely. The
cost of turnover in￿ uences the preference for the strong ruler via the value of the outside option.
The higher the cost of turnover, the lower the oligarchs￿equilibrium payo⁄. As under the strong
dictator, one of the oligarchs is expropriated completely (with probability 1￿￿
2 ), the negative e⁄ect
of higher turnover costs is more relevant for the case of the weak ruler where both oligarchs get
their outside option.
Let us now check whether (7) and (8) are positive. Substituting (11) into (7) and (8) we ￿nd
that both are positive as long as assumption (3) holds.
3.4 Welfare analysis
Given the Assumption (3), the strong dictator is always more e¢ cient than the weak one: the
di⁄erence in joint surpluses [US + 2VS] ￿ [UW + 2VW] = ￿
1￿￿ is always positive. Yet, as long as
condition (12) is violated, the oligarchs appoint a weak dictator. Why does this ine¢ ciency emerge?
The oligarchs do not appoint a strong ruler because there is no way for the ruler to commit to not
expropriating. In a sense, our model illustrates the non-existence of a ￿political Coase theorem￿
(Acemoglu, 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). The oligarchs would like to appoint a dictator
who would commit to enforce property rights and not to expropriate the oligarchs. The problem
is that no dictator can credibly promise both. A weak dictator cannot commit to enforce property
rights: as he can be overthrown by a single oligarch, he cannot constrain their rent-seeking. A
strong dictator does enforce property rights in equilibrium but cannot commit not to expropriate.
4 Path dependence and the e⁄ect of uncertainty
The analysis above describes the equilibrium choice of the dictator by the oligarchs. How does
this equilibrium emerge? What happens if for some reason the incumbent dictator is weak while
￿ > ￿ ￿? What happens if ￿ < ￿ ￿ but the incumbent dictator is strong? In either situation, oligarchs
would rather replace the dictator. In order to prevent this, the incumbent dictator may be willing
to o⁄er the oligarchs additional compensation for keeping him in o¢ ce.
134.1 Removing a weak incumbent
If the returns to establishing secure property rights ￿ are su¢ ciently high, the oligarchs are ready
to remove the dictator even though it costs K: This is the case whenever
VS > K + VW: (13)
This inequality implies VS > VW hence VN = VS ￿ K: Substituting this into (6) and (9), we ￿nd
that (13) is equivalent to ￿






> ￿ ￿: (14)
Proposition 2 Suppose that the incumbent dictator is weak and (14) holds. Then either oligarch
will remove the dictator from the o¢ ce and replace him with a strong one.
When the condition (14) holds, either oligarch is happy to remove the dictator. It only remains
to check that the dictator cannot bribe the oligarchs. As the dictator is weak he has to bribe
both oligarchs; the dictator has to o⁄er either oligarch at least VS ￿ K ￿ VW: It is easy to check
that whenever (14) holds, the dictator cannot a⁄ord giving each oligarch this much. The result is
intuitive. As the weak dictator is socially ine¢ cient, his payo⁄is below the bribes he has to provide
the oligarchs to remain in power.
4.2 Removing a strong incumbent
Now consider the opposite situation when dictator is strong but the oligarchs would rather appoint
a weak one. This would be the case whenever
VW > K + VS: (15)
This inequality implies VS < VW hence VN = VW ￿ K: Substituting into (6) and (9), we ￿nd







; it is easy to show that ￿￿￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿ K
2(1￿￿)
￿ < ￿ ￿:
As the dictator is strong, the condition (15) is necessary but not su¢ cient. The oligarchs need
to coordinate their actions against the dictator. The dictator will try to use the divide-and-rule
tactics by bribing one of the oligarchs. The dictator is removed in equilibrium if and only if
VW ￿K < VS +US: Indeed, if O1 moves to remove the dictator, the other oligarch￿ s best response
is to ask the dictator for a bribe. The coalition of the dictator and O2 has the joint surplus of
VS + US if dictator stays in power and only VW ￿ K if he is removed.
14Substituting into (6) and (9), we ￿nd that VW ￿ K < VS + US can only be the case if the
property rights protection is socially suboptimal ￿ < 0:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the incumbent dictator is strong and assumption (3) holds. Then it
is a dominant strategy for either oligarch not to try to remove the dictator.
If O1 tries to remove the dictator, O2 is better-o⁄ deviating and colluding with the dictator. If
O1 is content with the dictator, it makes no sense for O2 even to try to remove the dictator: the
dictator is strong and O2 cannot remove him alone.
It is important to emphasize that there is a non-trivial range of parameters for which the
condition (15) does hold; each oligarch would bene￿t from replacing the dictator. However, as they
cannot resolve the coordination problem, the dictator remains in power.
4.3 E⁄ect of uncertainty
The results above suggest an important asymmetry between the weak and the strong dictators.
While non-trivial turnover costs K provide certain protection to either type of dictators, removing
the strong dictator is impossible even if K is low. The matter is that the strong dictator can
use divide-and-rule tactics. Therefore there can emerge a dynamic path along which the oligarchs
prefer to replace the strong dictator with the weak one but cannot solve the coordination problem.
Ironically, the strong dictator is brought in to help oligarchs resolve the coordination problem with
enforcing their property rights against each other. On the other hand, the dictator takes advantage
of the very same coordination problem to remain in power and expropriate the oligarchs.
In the model above, parameters are stable over time. Hence the choice of dictator which is
optimal today will continue to be optimal tomorrow as well. Now we shall consider the case where
the economic environment changes over time. For example, there can be bad economic times (low
￿ and therefore low ￿ = ￿L) and prosperity (high ￿ = ￿H > ￿L). Consider the case where
￿L < ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ < ￿H (see (12)). In other words, if the oligarchs knew that prosperity ￿ = ￿H is
to last forever, they would choose a strong dictator. If they believe that the recession ￿ = ￿L is
to last forever they would choose a weak dictator.
While coping with the uncertainty of the future economic environment, the oligarchs must
take into account the implications of irreversibility of appointing a strong dictator (similarly to
the irreversibility of investment, see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). By appointing a weak dictator,
the oligarchs acquire an option to replace the dictator with a strong one if the state changes to
15￿ = ￿H: On the other hand, if the oligarchs appoint a strong dictator, they e⁄ectively give up
this replacement option. Therefore, the oligarchs would be biased in favor of appointing a weak
dictator.
To formalize this simple intuition, we assume that oligarchs need to appoint a dictator before
uncertainty is resolved. They know that once the dictator is appointed, uncertainty is realized and
￿ is either ￿L with probability ￿ or ￿H with probability 1￿￿ (and remains at this level forever).
Denote Vd(￿) the payo⁄ of an oligarch if the dictator￿ s type is d 2 fS;Wg and the realized
economic environment is ￿ 2 f￿L;￿Hg: If the oligarchs choose a weak dictator, their expected




+ ￿VW(￿L): Indeed, if the true state is ￿ = ￿L they will keep
the weak dictator in place, and if ￿ = ￿H > ￿￿, they replace the weak dictator with a strong one.
If the oligarchs appoint a strong dictator, they know that they will be unable to replace him
whatever the realization of uncertainty; therefore the payo⁄is (1￿￿)VS(￿H)+￿VS(￿L): Comparing
these two payo⁄s, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume 0 < ￿L < ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ < ￿H: Then the oligarchs choose a strong dictator
whenever
(1 ￿ ￿)K <
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿L￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)
: (16)
Otherwise they choose a weak dictator.
The Proposition implies that the emergence of strong property rights protection is unlikely if
uncertainty is high. Indeed, consider the case where the variance of the economic environment
increases (e.g. ￿H increases and ￿L decreases keeping the expected value ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H
constant). Then, the condition (16) is less likely to hold and the oligarchs are more likely to choose
a weak dictator. This situation may well occur when the expected returns to protecting property
rights ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H are above ￿ ￿ so that oligarchs would choose a strong dictator on average.
Yet, even in this case if the uncertainty is high, the oligarchs prefer to appoint a weak ruler: the
option value of replacing an incumbent is large.
5 Extensions
5.1 E⁄ect of uncertainty in a general model
The example above assumes that the uncertainty is resolved once and for all. In this section, we
consider a more general setting with a Markovian uncertainty with two states of nature: bad times
16(L) and good times (H). For simplicity￿ s sake, the states di⁄er only in terms of the returns to
containing rent-seeking: ￿L < ￿H:
If the present state is H, in the next period it remains H with probability 1￿￿, and switches to
L with probability ￿: If the current state is L, it does not change with probability 1￿￿ or returns
to H with probability ￿:
We shall consider an equilibrium where ￿L is su¢ ciently low so that the oligarchs appoint a
weak dictator in the state L. The question is whether they will appoint a strong dictator in the
state H. On one hand, in this state, the returns to stronger property rights ￿H are high; on the
other hand, once the state L arrives, the oligarchs would not be able to remove the strong dictator.4
We will study the equilibrium where the second e⁄ect dominates, so the oligarchs prefer to
appoint a weak dictator even in the state H. Reproducing the analysis from Section 2, we establish
the following system of equations for oligarchs￿payo⁄s V i
S;W;N and the joint surplus Ji
S;W (here the
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In order for the solution to be an equilibrium outcome we need to require V H
S ￿ V H
W < 0 <
V L
S ￿ V L
W: We have already assumed above that ￿L is su¢ ciently low so the right-hand side
inequality holds. The left-hand side one makes sure that even in the high state, the oligarchs are
























This inequality holds whenever volatility of economic environment ￿H ￿ ￿L is su¢ ciently high.
5.2 Number of oligarchs
If there are N > 2 oligarchs, the analysis is much more complicated. First, there emerges a whole
range of dictators￿strengths. Can there be a dictator of an intermediate strength n 2 (1;N) so that
4In this setting, once a strong dictator is appointed, he will remain in o¢ ce forever. A more realistic setup would
involve a small exogenous probability of dictator￿ s departure; results would be similar.
17he can commit not to expropriate individual oligarchs and at the same time will be strong enough
to contain rent-seeking? In order to do the latter, he must take at least two oligarchs to remove him
from o¢ ce (if n = 1; each oligarch can threaten to deviate unilaterally, hence the dictator will fail
to stop rent-seeking). However, for any n ￿ 2; the dictator can easily expropriate n ￿ 1 oligarchs.
How does the severity of the commitment problem change at larger N? Consider an extreme
case of the strong dictators who can only be removed by consensus. In this case, the dictator
expropriates (N ￿1)=N oligarchs. On the other hand, an individual oligarch￿ s returns to property
rights protection are proportional to his bargaining power ￿=N: Hence the greater number of
oligarchs, the more likely the appointment of a weak dictator ￿even though the need for a strong
dictator is greater. Indeed, as N goes up, the problem of coordination between oligarchs becomes
even more severe.
5.3 Democratic transition
We have considered the case of weak and strong dictators. Can the oligarchs appoint a very strong
ruler who cannot be overthrown even by a consensus of oligarchs? In our framework, it would be
equivalent to a transition to democracy. Why would oligarchs agree to give up power without any
chance to get it back? This may be the case if two conditions hold: (i) there is a need for the
dictator￿ s investment in protection of property rights that extend beyond the current period (ii)
the dictator can commit not to expropriate the dictators completely or there is a non-trivial chance
that dictator resigns, dies or becomes weaker. Then, the oligarchs may prefer to appoint a very
strong dictator in order to provide him with incentives to invest.
In case these conditions do not hold, such a transition may only happen against the will of the
oligarchs, via a popular uprising (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006) or through a con￿ ict
between the oligarchs if those are heterogeneous. The latter possibility is modelled in Acemoglu
(2007) where low-skilled oligarchs may prefer to join the poor.
5.4 Endogenous popular support
Our results would only be reinforced in a setting where the dictator￿ s popular support (and therefore
his strength) would be endogenous to the economic performance. In such a model, oligarchs would
be even more reluctant to appoint a strong dictator in good economic times: this dictator would
soon gain immunity from the oligarchs￿pressures.
186 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a dynamic model of the interaction between dictators and oligarchs.
Oligarchs are powerful economic agents who behave strategically both in economics and politics.
As the economic institutions are imperfect, oligarchs su⁄er from continued rent-seeking and are
interested in building a state that would resolve their coordination problem and constrain rent-
seeking. We show that such a state does not always emerge. Indeed, the oligarchs want to appoint
a ruler who would both protect their property rights from other oligarchs and not expropriate
the oligarchs himself. This trade-o⁄ is hard to resolve. If the oligarchs appoint a weak dictator,
he cannot constrain oligarchs￿rent-seeking. If the oligarchs appoint a strong dictator, he does
protect the oligarchs from each other but cannot commit not to expropriate some oligarchs himself.
Therefore, in some situations, the oligarchs would rather appoint the weak dictator even though
the strong dictator is Pareto optimal. We also show that once the strong dictator is appointed
he cannot be removed ￿even if the oligarchs are better-o⁄ under a weak dictator. The strong
dictator can use divide-and-rule tactics to exploit the very same coordination failure between the
oligarchs that the latter requested him to resolve. This irreversibility implies two predictions. First,
appointing a strong dictator is an even less attractive choice for the oligarchs. It is therefore not
surprising that in many oligarchic economies we observe a weak state and persistent rent-seeking
even when stronger protection of property rights is clearly better for everyone.
Second, the probability of appointing a weak ruler increases in the degree of economic uncertainty.
This is why strong property rights are unlikely to emerge in countries with volatile terms of trade,
in particular in resource-rich economies.
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